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Labor market policies have been re-configured during the a´ctiva-
tion turn' in labor market policy-making in the 1990s. This included 
restricting behavioral requirements for job seekers and benefit 
claimants, but also improving services (e.g. better placement ser-
vices). In a nutshell, the r`ights and responsibilities' of jobseekers 
and labor market participants were re-balanced. To date, there is is 
no indicator that could capture this in a quantitative way. This paper 
sets out to fill this gap. Using a number of quantitative indicators for 
20 core OECD countries, it is shown what instruments countries use 
and how they balance instruments that either enforce labor mar-
ket participation or enable to participate. It is shown that countries 
are overall rather similar with regard to the degree of enforcement 
(responsibilities), but differ with regard to the support (rights) they 
offer. Despite similarities and differences transcending welfare re-
gimes, three `worlds of activation' can be distinguished.
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Im Zuge des `activation turn' wurden während der 1990er Jahre zahl-
reiche Arbeitsmarktreformen durchgeführt. Dies umfasste strengere 
Verhaltensregeln für Arbeitslose und Leistungsbezieher, aber auch 
Verbesserungen von Sachleistungen (bspw. verbesserte Arbeitsver-
mittlung). Kurz gesagt, die Rechte und Pflichten von Arbeitslosen 
sowie Personen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt wurden neu austariert. Der-
zeit gibt es nur wenig Möglichkeiten, dies quantitativ zu erfassen. 
Dieses Papier stellt einen Versuch dar, diese Lücke zu füllen. Unter 
Verwendung einer Reihe von quantitativen Indikatoren für 20 Kern-
OECD Länder wird gezeigt, welche Instrumente von diesen Ländern 
in welchem Umfang verwendet werden, und in welchem Verhältnis 
`fördernde' und `fordernde' Instrumente stehen. Es wird gezeigt, 
dass sich die Länder bezüglich des Ausmaßes des `Forderns' (Pfli-
chte) generell recht ähnlich sind, jedoch deutliche Unterschiede beim 
Umfang des `Förderns' erkennbar sind. Trotz Ähnlichkeiten und 
Unterschiede über die Grenzen der Wohlfahrtsstaats-Regime hin-
weg können drei Welten der Aktivierung Arbeitsloser unterschieden 
werden.
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It is well documented that there has been 
a re-orientation of labor market policies 
in Western countries during the last two 
decades (Barbier/Ludwig-Mayerhofer 
2004; Bonoli 2010; Dingeldey 2007; Torf-
ing 1999; Weishaupt 2011). Reforms of 
benefit systems for persons of working 
age can be arranged along three dimen-
sions: support homogenization, policy co-
ordination, and activation (Clasen/Clegg 
2006a; b; 2011). Probably the most promi-
nent of these three is the new orientation 
towards activation. Possibly fueled by 
campaigns of international organizations 
such as the OECD Jobs Strategy (1994) or 
the European Employment Strategy (Goe-
tschy 1999; Rhodes 2005), countries now 
seek to increase levels of employment and 
economic activity instead of encouraging 
economic inactivity by `labor shedding’ 
(Esping-Andersen 1996b). Reforming la-
bor market policies means to re-balance 
the `rights and responsibilities’ (Ding-
eldey 2007, 844) of job seekers. However, 
countries do balance these rights and re-
sponsibilities differently (Dingeldey 2007; 
OECD 2006a, 190-2; Torfing 1999): while 
some countries (e.g. Denmark) combine 
rather generous benefits with a range of 
services that enable job seekers or inac-
tive persons to take up paid employment, 
others (e.g. the United Kingdom) provide 
rather low, means-tested benefits with 
strict behavioral requirements, thus forc-
ing job seekers into employment. Other 
countries, an example is Germany, have 
been latecomers in reforming benefit and 
tax systems so as to increase incentives to 
take up work, and in providing sufficient 
services (e.g. access to childcare) to en-
able all persons to take up employment. 
Lane Kenworthy (2010, 444) recently 
declared that so far “there have been no 
attempts to score or rank countries ac-
cording to [labor market] activation ef-
fort”. Studies that describe or explain this 
`activation turn’ (Bonoli 2010) often use 
the level of expenditure on active labor 
market policies (ALMPs) as an indicator 
for the ‘activation effort’ of a country (e.g. 
Burgoon 2001; see also Rueda 2007) 1. Yet 
ALMPs are but one instrument govern-
ments have to activate the unemployed 
and increase incentives for economic 
activity. Other studies analyze these de-
velopments in a more encompassing way 
(Dingeldey 2007; Weishaupt 2011), yet 
they cover only a limited number of coun-
tries and/or rely on qualitative case stud-
ies. Pfeifer (2012) has combined indica-
tors for the generosity of unemployment 
insurance schemes and social assistance 
and minimum income protection schemes 
to show how entire benefit systems for 
working-age persons are configured. This 
is, of course, highly relevant. Yet, focus-
sing only on configuration of benefit sys-
tems is still too narrow. In order to be able 
to conduct better quantitative analyses on 
labor market reforms, researchers will 
need data that takes into account all rele-
1 Rueda does this in one chapter of his book. 
However, he complements this by qualitative case 
studies.
1. Introduction
9the causes and determining factors for 
this development using quantitative tech-
niques. It would also improve possibilities 
to examine the outcomes of these reform 
policies. 
This paper will proceed as follows. 
The first section will discuss the specific 
features of employment-friendly or `ac-
tivating’ policies and formulate expecta-
tions about how rights and responsibili-
ties have been reconfigured. The second 
section presents the `activation toolbox’. 
This list of labor market policies includes 
the configuration of active and passive 
unemployment benefits and related poli-
cies that can be manipulated in order to 
increase incentives and abilities to take up 
work or to create jobs. The third section 
presents descriptive statistics in order to 
provide a first picture of how countries 
combine different elements from this 
toolbox. Fifth, these indicators are com-
bined into two composite indicators that 
measure the mix of rights and responsi-
bilities across countries. A final section 
concludes.
vant aspects of labor market policies. This 
paper sets out to fill this gap, following 
the examples of similar endeavors such as 
Höpner et al. (2011) (regulatory policies), 
Siaroff (1999) (corporatism), or Gornick et 
al. (1997) (family policies). Mostly, how-
ever, the inspiration comes from Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) de-commodification 
score. While the task cannot be completed 
in this paper, the long-term goal is to con-
struct an indicator for `activation effort’ 
that can be used alongside de-commodi-
fication scores to show how welfare states 
are positioned and have changed along 
the two dimensions. This would improve 
the possibilities to investigate how these 
two aspects can be combined and why 
they are combined in certain ways (cf. 
Bradley/Stephens 2006; Huo et al. 2008).
This paper will make two contribu-
tions. First, it provides quantitative data 
on the mix of `rights and responsibilities’ 
in 20 industrialized OECD countries in 
the mid-2000s and thus provides a snap-
shot of the situation after the `activation 
turn’ that took place during the 1990s. It 
is shown that, overall, the OECD world is 
quite similar regarding the responsibili-
ties of job seekers - despite the fact that 
countries differ in their use of single in-
struments. Countries do differ with regard 
to the support they offer to job seekers. 
Hence, while almost all countries place 
significant obligations on job seekers, the 
main discerning feature is whether these 
obligations are balanced by rights or not. 
Second, it provides operationalizations 
and data sources that can serve as a start-
ing point to assemble a more encompass-
ing (both in space and time) dataset. This 
would improve the possibilities to find 
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sion schemes. At the beginning of the 
1990s, this was increasingly perceived as 
a wrong way to deal with the unemploy-
ment problem. At the heart of the activa-
tion turn of the 1990s lies the recognition 
that unemployment can be structural in 
nature (cf. Serrano Pascual 2007a; Torfing 
1999, 10). Political discourses and reform 
agendas, exemplified by, but not limited 
to, campaigns of international organiza-
tions, have adopted a broad perspective. 
Rather than introducing new policies or 
adjusting single programs, entire welfare 
states are supposed to be made more em-
ployment-friendly.
First, it was recognized that unem-
ployment cannot be eliminated by mac-
ro-economic management alone. Even 
in the presence of favorable economic 
conditions, tax-benefit systems may dis-
incentivize economic activity, for instance 
in cases where the difference between 
net wages and net benefits is too small 
or even negative (when taking up a job 
reduces the net income). In this regard, 
tax-benefit systems set `unemployment 
and inactivity traps’ (Lindvall 2010; OECD 
2007b) and lead to structural unemploy-
ment. From a certain ideological stand-
point, the unemployed were seen as un-
able to find employment because they 
lack the necessary skills and motivation 
to compete in the labor market. They 
require treatment (thus the term moral-
therapeutic intervention) to raise their 
self-esteem, to overcome personal prob-
lems, and to maintain a life independent 
of government support. This is supposed 
Are we dealing with a new phenomenon 
here? Is it not the case that the Nordic 
countries, but also the Continental Euro-
pean countries have been providing train-
ing schemes for the unemployed (Hal-
vorsen/Jensen 2004; Ludwig-Mayerhofer/
Wroblenski 2004), and have there not 
always been conditions that benefit claim-
ants had to adhere to in order to continue 
to receive benefits? In this section, it is 
argued that there has been a change in 
two important respects: first, while full 
employment is not a new goal, the goal 
to maximize economic activity and to in-
crease employment is new. Second, in 
order to achieve this, the entitlements of 
the unemployed are no longer inalienable 
social rights, but increasingly conditional 
on certain behaviors or attitudes of the 
unemployed. The crucial differences in 
how this has been implemented lie not 
so much in the strictness of these crite-
ria, but in whether these requirements are 
balanced with support or not. Despite ter-
minological differences, three dominant 
`activation regimes’ can be discerned.  
The activation turn has to be seen 
against the backdrop of labor market poli-
cies during the 1980s (Bonoli 2010): the 
focus of active labor market policies in 
the 1980s used to be to keep participants 
occupied and reduce the deterioration of 
their human capital, hoping that the next 
economic upturn would `suck’ them out 
of unemployment and back into the labor 
market. Concomitantly, those with fewer 
chances in the labor market were led out 
of it via early retirement or disability pen-
2. 'Activation' - what’s so new about it?
11
(iii) employment (or active labour 
market - ALM) programmes; but 
also (iv) policies involving tradi-
tional social policy and tax policy, 
which aim at reforming the `tax and 
benefits systems’” (Barbier/Lud-
wig-Mayerhofer 2004, 426).
This is best exemplified by reform 
discourses triggered by international or-
ganizations like the European Union’s Eu-
ropean Employment Strategy, that aim to 
coordinate labor market policies among 
its member states (Kok 2003; 2004; Rho-
des 2005), or the OECD Jobs Strategy 
(OECD 1994) both make recommenda-
tions for reforms in a number of policy ar-
eas, starting with unemployment benefits 
but including also tax and family policies. 
Even if one does not believe that these 
campaigns are actually causing reforms 
(for a discussion see Zeitlin 2005; 2009), 
the contemporary political discourse on 
labor market reforms involves more poli-
cies than just unemployment insurance 
benefits. Hence, in order to fully grasp the 
change that has occurred and what its ef-
fects were, one needs a perspective that is 
not limited to a subset of policy areas or 
benefit schemes. 
How were welfare states actually re-
shaped? One might expect that a com-
mon `activation paradigm’ dictates the 
development of labor market policies 
into a common direction. In fact, looking 
at the development over time, there are 
signs of common reform trends. While 
Bonoli (2010) argues that paradigms di-
rected the development of labor market 
policies in common directions, irrespec-
tive of welfare regimes, Weishaupt (2011) 
to be achieved by a stricter monitoring of 
their behavior, increased conditionality, 
and tightened behavioral requirements 
to discipline the unemployed. This con-
stituted a paradigmatic change of labor 
market policies. More than just helping 
the unemployed back into employment, 
it was aimed at adjusting the attitudes 
of individuals towards employment, thus 
`producing’ a kind of worker that is com-
patible with the requirements of a modern 
labor market. Most importantly, it does 
so by altering social rights. It redefines 
how a `fair’ treatment of job seekers is 
supposed to look like, what behavior can 
be expected from job seekers, and what 
a government can do to induce that kind 
of behavior (Handler 2003; 2009; Serrano 
Pascual 2007b; Weishaupt 2011). 
Second, this trend towards activation 
has not been confined to the area of un-
employment benefit systems. As Barbier 
and Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004) argue, 
there has been a trend towards a sys-
tematic re-structuring of entire welfare 
states with the aim of making them more 
employment-friendly (see also Dingeldey 
2007; Kenworthy 2010; Torfing 1999; 
Weishaupt 2011). It is argued that
“the domains of social protection 
potentially activated are not only 
the programmes for the assisted 
or the unemployed. They comprise 
(i) benefit programmes (unemploy-
ment insurance and various `as-
sistance’ schemes for working age 
groups (including disability and 
other family related benefits)); (ii) 
pension systems, and most particu-
larly, early retirement programmes; 
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finds convergence but also ongoing differ-
ences. While countries continue to differ 
regarding the generosity of benefits, they 
show signs of convergence regarding the 
conditionality and duration of benefits 
but also regarding services to persons of 
working-age. Hence, as a first expectation 
of what could be found when analyzing 
comparative data, one can expect signs of 
convergence in these aspects: increased 
conditionality but improved services. 
However, the available data do not allow 
to analyze developments over time. But 
rather than looking for convergence, one 
can expect to find similarities.
It should, however, not be news that 
the effect of functional pressures has al-
ways been transposed via political actors 
and institutions (Myles/Quadagno 2002), 
thus shaping different welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). In fact, looking 
at studies that emphasize cross-sectional 
differences (Barbier/Ludwig-Mayerhofer 
2004; Clasen/Clegg 2006a; b; 2011; Ding-
eldey 2007; Serrano Pascual/Magnusson 
2007), at least two different `activation 
regimes’ can be identified. Despite slight 
differences, there is consensus that acti-
vation strategies re-balance rights and 
responsibilities of job seekers so as to in-
crease work incentives. The main finding 
is that the responsibilities have been in-
creased and there have been cuts to social 
rights. However, the main differences lie 
in the rights that are granted to job seek-
ers. While retrenchment has been quite 
unilateral in a range of countries (mostly 
in the Anglo-Saxon world), cutbacks or 
increased duties have been balanced by 
improved services and support. Hence, 
as a second expectation, one can expect 
to find ongoing differences regarding the 
extent to which increased  obligations are 
paired with rights or not.
There is, of course, always a third 
option: doing nothing. Serrano Pascual 
(ibid.) argues that the Southern Euro-
pean countries (Spain, Portugal) do not 
place many obligations, but do also not 
grant many rights to job seekers. Ding-
eldey (2007), Clasen and Clegg (2006a; 
b; 2011), and Clegg (2007) find that there 
have been reforms of labor market poli-
cies in Continental Europe, but they have 
been done in a selective and incremen-
tal manner. As a final expectation, there 
might be a group of countries where acti-
vating reforms were not or only incremen-
tally introduced. Benefit provision is still 
largely passive, i.e there is little enforce-
ment in the form of benefit cutbacks, but 
also little enablement in the form of ser-
vices and support to job seekers.
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The analytical range of this paper lies in 
between analyzing single policies or types 
of policies on the one, and analyzing en-
tire policy paradigms (Hall 1993) on the 
other hand. This paper focusses on acti-
vation strategies. These are defined as 
configurations of ALMPs, passive benefit 
systems, and related policies (e.g. family 
or tax policies) to activate unemployed 
and inactive persons and increase incen-
tives to look for and take up paid employ-
ment (Barbier/Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; 
Dingeldey 2007). Several authors (Bonoli 
2010; Dingeldey 2007; Kenworthy 2010; 
Torfing 1999; Weishaupt 2011, 69: table 
4) have already assembled lists of activa-
tion tools 2, i.e. elements of an activation 
strategy. It is these lists that are used to 
construct the `activation toolbox’. The fi-
nal list of `activation tools’ is presented in 
table 1 (p. 14). The elements are distin-
guished by whether they increase incen-
tives to take up employment by increasing 
social rights (enablement) or by reducing 
social rights (enforcement) (using the ter-
minology by Dingeldey 2007). They are 
further distinguished by whether they 
have a direct financial effect or whether 
this effect is more indirect (cf. Weishaupt 
2011).
All elements are included in at least 
one of the aforementioned author’s lists. 
Their lists include `traditional’ ALMPs 
such as training, public employment, or 
2 Instead of a lengthy summary of each of these 
lists, the main groups of tools and the rationale for 
including them are described.
wage subsidies, as well as policies that 
are usually not directly labelled as `active 
labor market programs’. These include 
family and tax policies, passive unem-
ployment benefits, and policies related to 
economic policy such as wage policies or 
the flexibilization of employment regula-
tions. All these authors include re-con-
figurations of passive benefits (limiting 
the duration, increasing conditionality, 
lowering levels), training and `upskilling’, 
and increased job placement efforts (ei-
ther via increased obligations on the part 
of the job seeker or improved services). 
The configuration of passive benefits (e.g. 
unemployment insurance or assistance) 
can (dis-)incentivize employment. There-
fore, while it is certainly true that passive 
benefit reception is quite the opposite of 
activation, it is still important to include 
them. Active measures and passive ben-
efits interact with each other (see also 
Calmfors 1994, 28-9; Martin 2000; Rueda 
2007; Saint-Paul 1998) 3. Wage subsidies, 
for instance, may be quite useless if un-
employment benefits are so generous that 
taking up a subsidized job actually low-
ers the income of recipients. Accordingly, 
cuts in unemployment benefits can be 
seen as part of an activation strategy since 
they increase incentives to take up work. 
3 I am also thankful to Pablo Beramendi for point-
ing this out to me.
3. The 'activation toolbox'
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Exit-options such as public employ-
ment (where the government acts as an 
`employer of last resort’), or early retire-
ment and disability benefit schemes can 
have similar effects. That is, they set 
incentives to withdraw from the labor 
market. Closing these exit-routes is a re-
duction of social rights, but increases in-
centives to look for and to take up work. 
Hence, the (partial) abolition of early-re-
tirement, disability pensions, and public 
job-creation is a case of enforcement (ac-
tivation by reducing social rights).
An alternative or complement to cuts 
in levels and duration is to increase the 
conditionality of benefits. In order to con-
tinue recipiency, job seekers often have to 
prove that they have been actively look-
ing for jobs, they also have less valid rea-
sons to refuse job offers, and they may 
face sanctions in case of non-compliance 
(Clasen et al. 2001; Hasselpflug 2005; 
Ministry of Finance 1998; Venn 2012). 
Reductions in the strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) limit the 
rights of workers, but may increase the 
likelihood of finding a job for job seekers 
(see Bradley/Stephens 2006; Saint-Paul 
2002).
Wage subsidies for employers and 
employees limit labor costs or increase 
the payoff from taking up work. Tax cred-
its and limits in contributions work in the 
same way, that is they reduce the costs for 
employers to hire and they increase rev-
enues for employees. The abolishment of 
tax regulations that favor the male single-
earner family model aims at encouraging 
15
female employment. Paid maternal or 
parental leave schemes help women to 
reconcile work and family responsibilities 
and increase their ability to take up em-
ployment.
Increased assistance for jobseekers, 
e.g. through individualized counseling 
and advice, is an element that increases 
the rights of jobseekers. More invest-
ment in human capital enables persons 
with low or obsolete skills to participate 
in the labor market. Improved access to 
training and re-training thus constitutes 
an increase in social rights. The same ap-
plies to services for families. For instance, 
childcare services free women from care 
responsibilities at home and thus increase 
possibilities for taking up employment. 
Regulating part-time or flexible employ-
ment, for instance by guaranteeing equal 
wages or benefits, increases incentives to 
take up work for persons who chose not to 
take up full-time employment, e.g. second 
earners in couples. 
Not all of the elements in the men-
tioned author’s lists are included here, 
however. Weishaupt (2011, 244) reports 
that start-up subsidies play only a very 
minor role among labor market programs 
and there is almost no change comparing 
the 1990s to the 2000s. Accordingly, they 
are left out. So called `other services’ pro-
vided for persons with substance abuse or 
mental health problems, mobility assis-
tance, and so called `career ladders’ are 
also not included here. Social services for 
persons with various health problems are 
excluded since they do not actually set in-
centives, but make people fit to adequate-
ly respond to incentives. The same ap-
plies to mobility benefits for residents of 
rural areas with limited employment op-
portunities. Career ladders are “small in 
scale” (Kenworthy 2010, 443) and, more 
importantly, they incentivize upward mo-
bility within or between jobs, but not the 
behavior of inactive or unemployed per-
sons. Put another way, they affect already 
employed, not unemployed or inactive 
persons. Kenworthy and Weishaupt also 
include incomes policy (reductions of real 
wages, minimum wages). Lowering real 
wages might increase the incentives of 
employers to hire less-qualified job seek-
ers, while higher minimum wages might 
increase the wedge between wages and 
benefits and thus increase incentives to 
take up a job. They are excluded here for 
the following reasons. First, it is unclear 
whether high wages have a positive effect 
on employment by increasing the wedge 
between benefits and wages, or whether 
they have a negative effect by increasing 
labor costs and thus reducing demand for 
labor. Second, it is hard to operational-
ize political efforts to reduce real wages. 
Reduced real wages may be achieved by 
lowering social assistance or unemploy-
ment benefits (thus lowering the res-
ervation wage). Kenworthy argues that 
governments have only limited influence 
over the development of wages. They may 
form a pact with the social partners in or-
der to limit wage increases. However, the 
effect of these pacts on the actual incen-
tives of job seekers are then rather indi-
rect. Furthermore, other instruments are 
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conceivable 4. Thus, because the effect is 
theoretically unclear and the operation-
alization is bound to be incomprehensive, 
incomes policy is not included here.
Referring to the argument of the pre-
vious section, the more (less) rights and 
the less (more) responsibilities, the more 
pronounced the enablement (enforce-
ment) approach to activating labor market 
policy. For instance, a country may pro-
vide only limited unemployment benefits, 
no exit-options, low real wages, strict 
conditions for benefit recipients, and low 
employment protection on the one, and 
limited services and protection on the 
other hand. This would not set incen-
tives to continue benefit recipiency longer 
than possible, but it would also not pro-
vide help that would enable persons to be 
economically active. Vice versa, a country 
can provide generous benefits and high 
real wages and combine this with ser-
vices that enable everyone to participate 
in a high-skill/high wage economy. The 
former would be a `market-reliant’ way, 
the latter would be more `service-reliant’. 
A third way is to rely on `labor-shedding’ 
(Esping-Andersen 1996a) (yet according 
to recent studies (Bonoli 2010; Dingeldey 
2007; Weishaupt 2011), countries have 
4 The case of the United Kingdom during the 1980s 
is illustrative. The central government was unable 
to implement a successful incomes policy aimed 
at reducing wages. The response of the Thatcher 
governments was to adopt a hard currency policy 
to channel the effect of increased real wages on 
employment. Increasing real wages would, in the 
absence of expansionary monetary policies, have 
the effect of increasing unemployment. A hard 
monetary policy had thus a disciplining effect on 
unions, leading to reduced wage increases without 
adopting an incomes policy (Rhodes 2000). 
left this route or are on their way), or to 
provide low, but unconditional benefits, 
i.e. to maintain a passive policy stance. 
The following sections will present data 
on all these elements and on composite 
indices combining all these elements. The 
operationalization of each of these ele-
ments is discussed in the appendix.
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This section will proceed in two steps. 
First, descriptive statistics of all elements 
are shown to give an overview over the 
different configurations of labor market 
policies. Second, two indices will be con-
structed. One will measure the strength 
This subsection will present descriptive 
statistics of each of the indicators and thus 
give a first impression of which elements 
are used and how they are combined. 
Financial enforcing elements For the 
first three columns in table 2, low scores 
signal strong reliance on enforcing ele-
ments by (re-)commodifying labor where-
as in the last two columns, high scores 
indicate more enforcement. 
The first column in table 2 (p. 18) 
displays the generosity of unemploy-
ment insurance schemes (measured as 
the average net replacement rate times 
the duration, i.e. the `full-time equivalent 
replacement rate’). The obvious leader 
is Belgium. The duration of the scheme 
is unlimited but since it is hard to inter-
pret `infinite generosity’, a duration of five 
years is assumed (see appendix). Togeth-
er with an average replacement rate of 
61 percent 5, this amounts to a generosity 
score of 158.6 weeks in which one hun-
dred percent of the previous wage is re-
5 Not shown. See source of data.
4. Balances of rights and responsibilities
4.1  DEsCRIPTIvE sTATIsTICs
placed. Next in line is Denmark with a still 
comparatively high benefit generosity. 
Norway, Sweden, Portugal, and Switzer-
land are also countries with relatively high 
scores. The Anglo-Saxon world and Japan 
form the bottom group with around 11 to 
fifteen weeks of fully replaced wages. As 
mentioned above, Australia and New Zea-
land do not provide unemployment insur-
ance, hence their scores are set to zero. 
Ireland and Canada are more generous, 
but still surpassed by most of the Conti-
nental European countries with around 60 
to 70 weeks. Only Austria, Italy, and Ger-
many have relatively low scores here.
Looking at the generosity of social as-
sistance and minimum income schemes 
(measured as the ratio of net social assis-
tance benefits to the net average income 
in 2003), it is again the Nordic countries 
that take the lead. Denmark, Norway, 
Finland, and Sweden all belong to the 
top group. This group does also include 
Switzerland. Swiss social assistance ben-
efits are relatively generous (cf. Champion 
2011, 130), but recipiency may be very 
stigmatizing (Obinger 1999). Japan also 
of enabling, the other one the strength of 
enforcing elements in each country. The 
comparison of both indices will reveal the 
different balances of rights and responsi-
bilities in activating labor market policies.
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belongs to the top group. Not far behind 
are the Antipodean countries, which sig-
nals that they compensate the lack of un-
employment insurance to some degree. 
Continental Europe forms a heterogenous 
group; only Spain and Portugal stand out 
as very ungenerous. The Anglo-Saxon 
countries, first and foremost the United 
States, operate schemes with low benefit 
levels. Except for Ireland (and the Antipo-
deans), they do not even grant half the av-
erage income of the country’s population 
to their social assistance claimants.
The following two columns show the 
extent to which countries rely on exit-
options (measured as spending on early 
retirement and direct job-creation in 
percent of GDP). Most countries do not 
spend any money on early retirement and 
all countries that do report spending are 
European, most of them Continental and 
Southern European, countries. Yet, Den-
mark and Finland are the second and third 
biggest spenders. Direct job-creation is 
more widespread around the OECD coun-
tries. Again, Belgium is the top spender 
on this exit-option. As with early retire-
ment expenditures, most numbers are 
rather low. Overall, these two programs 
play a larger role in some countries, espe-
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cially in Europe. Yet, in most countries the 
numbers are comparatively low. 
Most effort to integrate disabled per-
sons into the labor market (measured us-
ing the indicator on integration effort in 
disability pension schemes provided by 
the OECD (2003)) is made in Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden, but also in Germany 
and the Netherlands. The reforms of the 
disability pension scheme in the Nether-
lands (van Oorschot 2002; van Oorschot/
Abrahamson 2003) seem to be reflected in 
this score. Furthermore, the high scores 
for the three Nordic countries show the 
orientation towards full-employment and 
integration in these countries. Most other 
countries have values that are fairly close 
to the mean. The only exceptions are Por-
tugal and Italy, where only little integra-
tion effort is made.
Non-financial enforcing elements Ta-
ble 3 (p. 20) shows the countries’ scores 
on enforcing elements that do not work 
by directly influencing the income of job-
seekers but by conditioning the access 
to benefits, the continuation of benefit 
payments, and the stiffness of employ-
ment protection legislation. Here, in all 
columns but the last, high scores signal 
heavy reliance on these instruments.
Job-search requirements (measured 
using data from Hasselpflug (2005)) are 
the strictest in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Australia - all countries 
that belong to the Anglo-Saxon group. Ire-
land and Japan have rather strict require-
ments as well. Unfortunately, Canada, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland are not in-
cluded in Hasselpflug’s data. The Nordic 
and the Continental European countries 
are quite similar in that they all have rela-
tively low scores, i.e. a low conditional-
ity when it comes to job-search activities. 
That means, apart from the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, this instrument is not that wide-
spread. 
The picture is different when the ex-
tent of reasons to refuse employment 
opportunities (using data by Hasselpflug 
(2005)) is taken into account. The United 
States and the United Kingdom have rath-
er low scores, yet Australia, Ireland  and 
the Netherlands have strict requirements. 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden have compar-
atively high scores, not far behind is Fin-
land. Germany and Austria have the strict-
est scores of all Continental European 
countries. Their scores are clearly above 
those of Continental France and Belgium, 
or Southern European Spain or Italy, as 
well as Japan.
The Continental and Southern Euro-
pean countries and Japan display a com-
paratively strong work-relatedness of ben-
efits (measured as the ratio of minimum 
employment record to qualifying period 
(cf. Clasen et al. 2001)) as their eligibil-
ity criteria are rather strict. Countries 
such as New Zealand and Australia with 
their means-tested schemes (see source 
of data) and the United Kingdom with its 
`de-differentiated’ (Clasen/Clegg 2006b) 
unemployment scheme are coded as zero. 
Nordic Sweden and Finland, but also the 
Netherlands do not link their benefits as 
much to the recipient’s employment his-
tory as the Continental and Southern Eu-
ropean countries do.
The sanctions in case of non-compli-
ance with obligations (using data by Has-
selpflug (2005)) are strictest in Portugal, 
France, the Netherlands, and the United 
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States. The Nordic countries Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, and Norway display 
rather low scores - so do Ireland, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Austria, Spain, Germany, 
and Japan. Accordingly, there is no clear 
pattern corresponding to welfare regimes.
Finally, employment protection leg-
islation (measured using the EPL score 
provided by the OECD (cf. Venn 2009)) 
is strictest in the Continental and South-
ern European countries, with the Nordic 
countries ranging somewhat lower but 
not far behind. The Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries (and Denmark) all have scores of less 
than two. The United States are the clear 
leader with the prototype of a hire-and-
fire labor market. 
To sum up the presentation of enforc-
ing elements, the Anglo-Saxon countries 
seem to be leading when it comes to en-
forcing labor market participation and re-
commodifying labor. Yet, the Nordic coun-
tries combine relatively generous benefits 
with relatively strict conditions on the 
part of the claimants when it comes to the 
availability to job offers. The Continental 
European countries tend to be rather reg-
ulated in terms of employment protection, 
rather generous and not too strict towards 
benefit claimants, and they are relying 
more on exit-options. However, their ben-
efits are more work-related than others. 
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These findings are in line with previous 
studies (Clasen/Clegg 2006b; Dingeldey 
2007; Esping-Andersen 1996a).
Financial enabling elements Descrip-
tive statistics of enabling elements that 
affect the income of persons directly are 
shown in table 4. Higher numbers in the 
first and last column signal more effort, 
higher numbers in the two middle col-
umns signal less effort (i.e. a higher tax 
and contribution burden).
The first column shows how much 
countries rely on subsidies to increase in-
centives to take up work  or to employ job 
seekers (measured as the percentage of 
spending on subsidies of the GDP). Swe-
den, Denmark, but also Italy and Spain 
take the lead. With the exception of Ire-
land, all Anglo-Saxon countries report nil 
or very low spending. It is again mostly 
European countries that set incentives via 
spending. Spending levels in the Anglo-
Saxon countries and Japan are rather low. 
While the Continental European countries 
are mostly clustered around the mean, 
Italy and Spain as Southern European 
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countries spend as much as the Nordic 
`big spenders’.
Anglo-Saxon countries are leading 
when it comes to encouraging low-income 
earners to seek employment by relieving 
them from high taxes and contributions 
(measured as the tax and contribution 
burden for persons earning two-thirds 
of the average wage, averaged over two 
family types). New Zealand levies eight 
percent, the United States three, but all 
other Anglo-Saxon countries do not col-
lect taxes from low-income earners. The 
Nordic countries have the highest tax and 
contribution burdens with Denmark tak-
ing the overall lead with 33 percent and 
Sweden achieving rank two with 23 per-
cent. Norway and Finland both belong to 
the countries with the highest burdens 
with both 13 percent. Except for Spain, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and France, 
the Continental and Southern European 
countries do not levy taxes or contribu-
tions. And even in those four countries, 
the burden is relatively low, compared to 
the Nordic countries. 
In no country in the OECD world 6 does 
a second income actually lower the over-
all household income (the tax burden on a 
second household income is measured as 
the `implicit tax on returning to work’ for 
a second earner at 67 percent of average 
earnings). However, some countries place 
a higher burden on a second income than 
others. This is shown in the third column 
of table 4. Quite surprisingly, the Anglo-
6 This applies, of course, only to the countries 
covered here. The OECD (2007b, 108) shows that 
some Central and Eastern European countries do 
actually have burdens of above 100 percent.
Saxon countries do have a comparatively 
high tax burden. The United Kingdom 
and Ireland `tax away’ almost 90 percent 
of the additional income, in the United 
States and New Zealand the loss amounts 
to around 75 percent, in Canada to around 
80 percent. This can be explained by 
the fact that private childcare provision 
plays a bigger role in these countries 
(Bahle 2008, 113). Since childcare costs 
are included in the calculation of the tax 
burden, high costs lower the income of 
dual-earner families. This is not to say 
that these values are exceptional. Austria, 
France, and Switzerland have very similar 
tax burdens. Other Continental countries 
are not far behind, for instance Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands with around 
60 percent. Denmark and Finland belong 
to the same group. The two other Nordic 
countries and Portugal form the top group 
with the lowest tax and contribution bur-
dens for second earners.
The last element to be presented 
is the generosity of maternal, paternal, 
and parental leave schemes (shortened 
to parental leave schemes; measured as 
the cumulative full-time equivalent dura-
tion of all three leave scheme payments). 
Since these schemes are usually comple-
mentary (see above), the original full-time 
equivalent durations for each scheme as 
reported by the OECD are summed up to 
show how many weeks parents can stay at 
home to take care of their kids. Australia 
and the United States do not operate these 
schemes, accordingly their generosity is 
zero. New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland (for the Anglo-Saxon group) and 
also Belgium, Switzerland and the Neth-
erlands (for the Continental group) have 
23
rather short durations. Southern Europe-
an Spain, Portugal, and Italy are not far 
ahead with durations of 17 to 20 weeks. 
With the exception of Finland, the Nordic 
countries (especially Norway and Swe-
den) are by far more generous than the 
rest with over one year of payments in 
Norway and Sweden and still almost one 
year in Denmark.  Austria and especially 
France are exceptionally generous in 
comparison to the other Continental Eu-
ropean countries.
Non-financial enabling elements
The last table in this subsection (table 5, 
p. 24) reports non-financial elements that 
have an enabling effect - basically public 
services and legal protections. Except for 
the first column, higher values indicate 
more effort.
The quality of labor market services is 
measured as the ratio of counselors at the 
public employment service (PES) to regis-
tered job seekers. The ratio of counselors 
to job seekers is by far the lowest in the 
United Kingdom, only around 8 jobseek-
ers are cared for by one counselor. Swe-
den and Norway do come relatively close, 
yet all other countries have much worse 
ratios. Three countries (Austria, Ireland, 
Netherlands) have ratios of around 70 
jobseekers to one counselor, five further 
countries (Switzerland, Portugal, France, 
Finland, and Denmark have ratios of be-
tween 100 and 120 jobseekers for each 
counselor. Far behind are Germany and 
Spain with 350 and 460 jobseekers per 
counselor, respectively. It should be men-
tioned that the number of missings is par-
ticularly high for this indicator. Yet, these 
results are confirmed by other studies (see 
Dingeldey 2007, 834-5 for a brief review).
The reliance on training and hu-
man capital development is measured as 
spending on training schemes in percent 
of the GDP. Confirming expectations, the 
Nordic countries are the top spenders 
on training schemes. Denmark is by far 
the biggest spender. France, Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland have quite similar 
spending levels to Sweden and Finland. 
This reflects the catching-up process in 
Continental Europe (Bonoli 2010, 442-3) 
- which did not take place that much in 
Belgium and the Netherlands - and the 
tradition of training schemes in Germany 
and Austria (Ludwig-Mayerhofer/Wro-
blenski 2004). The Southern European 
Countries remain on a lower level. The, 
again, spending-reluctant Anglo-Saxon 
countries (the exception is New Zealand) 
form the bottom group, together with Ja-
pan. 
The Nordic countries, with the nota-
ble exception of Finland, take the lead 
when it comes to providing employment-
friendly family services (enrollment rates 
in childcare and early childhood educa-
tion and care [ECEC]). Enrollment rates 
are presented as full-time equivalents, i.e. 
the rate of enrollment were all children at-
tending care facilities for 40 hours a week 
(cf. OECD 2011c). Denmark is the undis-
puted leader with around 60 percent of all 
children in full-time childcare. Next in line 
is Portugal with almost half of all children 
below the age of 3 in full-time care. Nor-
way and Sweden provide full-time care 
for about a third of all children in this age 
group, together with Belgium and France. 
Most of the other countries provide care 
for about 20 percent of all children. The 
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bottom group includes Ireland, Germany, 
Australia, and finally Austria with 10 per-
cent or less children in full-time care.
Enrollment rates are significantly 
higher for 3 to 5 year olds, yet the dif-
ferences between the countries persist. 
Enrollment rates for this age group look 
a lot more similar than enrollment rates 
for below-3 year olds (Adema et al. 2009, 
448-50) unless the intensity is accounted 
for. Almost all countries provide universal 
care in the form of kindergartens or pre-
schools. However, while most care for be-
low-3 year olds is full-time, the intensity 
of care for 3-5 year olds varies significant-
ly (Lambert 2008). This is reflected in the 
numbers in the penultimate column in ta-
ble 5. The fact that Denmark and Sweden 
achieve FTE enrollment rates of above 
100 percent stems from the fact they pro-
vide services for more than 40 hours per 
week and still have high enrollment rates. 
Since the intensity was only approximat-
ed, these numbers should be interpreted 
as possible FTE enrollment rates (given 
the operating hours of the facilities), not 
actual rates. Again, the usual suspects are 
in the top group: Denmark, Sweden, Nor-
way, and France. Finland and two South-
ern European countries (Spain, Italy) do 
not reach the same levels, but still achieve 
noticeably high rates. Belgium belongs, 
surprisingly, to the bottom group. Ger-
many and Austria perform significantly 
better now and form a middle group to-
gether with Switzerland, Portugal, Japan, 
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and Australia. The Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, most notably Canada, form the bot-
tom group. This, however, should not be 
taken to mean that there is no childcare 
- it is just that public provision is much 
less prevalent and preference is given to 
market-based service provision (OECD 
2006b, 46).
Finally, the degree to which part-time 
and flexible forms of employment are 
encouraged is shown in the last column 
(measured by the summary indicator 
measuring the presence of regulations of 
part-time and flexible employment). Nor-
way and Spain provide the most regula-
tions that support and protect `irregular’ 
employment. Sweden and the Nether-
lands are close. Next, there is a large 
group of countries that implemented 
at least half of the regulations that He-
gewisch (2009) and Hegewisch and Gor-
nick (2008) argue to be important. These 
are Australia, France, Germany, Belgium, 
and Portugal. The United Kingdom, Den-
mark, and Austria provide some protec-
tion, Italy only little. With the exception 
of Australia, all Anglo-Saxon countries 
provide none or only very little (Ireland) 
protection for part-time and flex-workers.
In sum, the results for enabling ele-
ments are more mixed in that no group 
of countries seems to be clearly superior 
to the others. The Nordic countries place 
more effort on financial elements than the 
others, yet they also have higher tax bur-
dens. However, some Southern and Con-
tinental European countries are leading 
with regard to the provision of childcare 
services (although the laggards in this 
regard are also in part Continental and 
Southern European countries), and some 
Anglo-Saxon countries have quite simi-
lar scores. Overall, the Nordic countries 
have consistently high values for most 
enabling elements, yet most of the time 
other countries report the highest values 
for single elements. The Continental and 
Southern European and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries do indeed score high on single 
elements, yet the overall performance is 
rather mixed.
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To summarize the different indicators into 
one coherent scheme and to so display 
the different emphases countries put on 
either enablement or enforcement, com-
posite indices for each dimension are con-
structed. The first part of this subsection 
will present how they were constructed 
and what adjustments were made. Sec-
ond, the results are presented and are 
compared with the findings of other stud-
ies. 
Following Gornick et al. (1997, 54-5), 
all indicators are rescaled to measure the 
level of policy effort. For each indicator, 
maximum effort is defined. Accordingly, 
each country is given a value that displays 
the percentage of maximum policy effort 
this country achieves. The scores are av-
eraged over the two dimensions (enforce-
ment and enablement) to measure the 
effort each country spends in each of the 
two dimensions. This is easier for some 
indicators (for instance enrollment rates, 
replacement rates, or expenditures that 
are already measured in percent) than 
for others (categorial variables and indi-
cators with no theoretical maximum, e.g. 
durations of payments). This is solved by 
- again - following Gornick et al. (1997). 
For instance, benefit durations are stand-
ardized as percentages of 52 weeks (i.e. 
one year). Some indicators are reversely 
scaled, that is a value of 0 represents 
maximum effort. For instance, given the 
fact that second earner employment is no-
where tax-neutral, a tax burden of 0 (neu-
trality) is the logical maximum effort (the 
same applies to EPL strictness).
For those elements that are measured 
using expenditure data (training, subsi-
dies, early retirement, direct job-creation), 
meaningful effort maxima have to defined. 
As shown above, their numbers all range 
between zero and one percent of GDP. By 
simply taking this number as a measure 
of effort, one would define expenditures 
of 100 percent of the GDP on, say, train-
ing schemes as maximum effort. This is 
clearly unrealistic. In addition, both the 
enforcement- and the enablement-scores 
would be biased upwards and downwards, 
respectively. This is because all countries 
would get scores of around 99 percent for 
the two (reversely scaled) exit-option indi-
cators and less than 1 percent for training 
and employment subsidies. As a remedy, 
maximum effort for training and employ-
ment subsidies is defined as expenditures 
per program worth of one percent of GDP. 
The reverse applies to early retirement 
and direct job-creation. This is also justi-
fied by the fact that expenditure on any 
single program very rarely exceeded one 
percent during the entire period from 
1985 to 2009 7.
Further adjustments are made to con-
trol for unlimited and means-tested sys-
tems. This concerns Belgium, Australia 
and New Zealand. The Belgian system is 
genuinely unlimited, but since it is impos-
sible to assign it the value ‘infinity’, it is 
given a duration of 260 weeks, that is five 
7 See OECD.Stat or Rueda (2007, 73-5).
4.2  COMPOsITE INDICEs
27
years 8 (see appendix and above). Categor-
ical indicators, first and foremost the ben-
efit conditionality indicators (Hasselpflug 
2005), are rescaled to fit the percentage 
scale. This is somewhat unsound as they 
are originally not metric. A transforma-
tion into a metric variable is actually not 
permissible. Also, it is equally not really 
sound to interpret a five percent increase 
in, say, enrollment rates as an actual five 
percent increase in policy effort. Accord-
ingly, the final enforcement/enablement 
scores should not be interpreted as met-
ric but as categorical, despite the fact 
that they have a rather large range. In a 
nutshell, rather than ‘upscaling’ categori-
cal indicators, metric and nominal indica-
tors are ‘downscaled’. The enforcement 
and enablement scores are computed as 
averages of the effort scores for each di-
mension. Missing information within indi-
vidual countries was ignored. There was 
no information on these indicators for a 
number of countries 9. These cases should 
be treated with caution.
Table 6 (p. 28) shows each country’s 
score on the enablement and enforce-
ment indices. It hardly comes as a sur-
8 This might sound unrealistic as maximum 
generosity would mean getting one’s former wage 
fully replaced for five years. However, consider 
that Denmark (for instance) has an unemployment 
insurance system that replaced 90 percent of the 
former wage for up to nine years in 1990 (Goul 
Andersen 2011). This would amount to a score 
of about two-thirds more than the average score 
assumed here.
9 Out of 19 indicators in total, information on five 
indicators was missing for Canada and New Zea-
land, on four for Switzerland, and three for Japan. 
One or two indicators were missing for several 
other countries (as shown in tables 2 through 5).
prise that the United States and Canada 
take the lead when it comes to enforce-
ment with scores of around .8. The other 
Anglo-Saxon countries are not far be-
hind with scores of around .7. Equally 
confirming previous findings is the fact 
that the Continental European countries 
form a heterogenous group with Belgium 
as the least enforcing country of all and 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Austria 
achieving scores equal to Anglo-Saxon 
countries. With the exception of Nor-
way, all the Nordic countries score rather 
low on the enforcement index. Far from 
forming a very de-commodifying bottom 
group, they range somewhere around the 
lower half of all countries. This is again 
consistent with other studies showing that 
the Nordic countries do sacrifice de-com-
modification to some degree in order to 
achieve a high level of employment (Huo 
et al. 2008). 
The Nordic countries, especially Swe-
den, Denmark, Norway have the highest 
enablement scores. France does actually 
come close to their levels, while Finland 
falls behind. The lowest scores can be 
found in the non-European countries. The 
United States are the least enabling coun-
try, New Zealand is only slightly ahead. 
Japan, Australia, and Canada have higher 
scores, but they are still clearly below 
average and there is still a tremendous 
difference between their scores and the 
scores of the Nordic countries. Continen-
tal and Southern European countries clus-
ter around the mean.
Enablement scores are generally low-
er than enforcement scores. Only Sweden 
and Denmark have slightly higher enable-
ment than enforcement scores. The dif-
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ference in Norway, Finland, France, and 
Belgium is only slightly positive. It is in 
these five countries where rights and 
duties are more or less balanced, not-
withstanding differences in the levels of 
both scores. Norway and Sweden have 
clearly high scores on both indices while 
Belgium scores low on both. Denmark 
and France look rather similar, contrary 
to other studies portraying Denmark as 
one of the leading countries in activation 
policies and France as a laggard (Bonoli 
2010; Clasen/Clegg 2006a; b). However, 
France has taken steps towards activat-
ing benefit recipients in recent years, 
albeit in a selective way (Clegg 2007; 
2011). Nonetheless, one should also keep 
in mind that the different elements have 
not been weighted according to any as-
sumed importance in the calculation of 
the index. Not all these elements have the 
same effect on actual employment levels 
(Bradley/Stephens 2006), hence the dif-
ferent outcomes in terms of labor market 
performance in France and Denmark. It is 
not really surprising that the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, led by the United States and 
including Japan, are very clearly leaning 
towards enforcement. It is especially the 
non-European countries that exhibit this 
strong tendency towards enforcement. 
This tendency is pronounced in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Ireland, but significantly 
less than in the other countries of the 
Anglo-Saxon group. Continental Europe 
is again rather heterogenous. While the 
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Netherlands and Switzerland exhibit the 
same tendency towards enforcement that 
is also found in the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, Belgium and France look rather like 
the Nordic countries. Austria, Germany, 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain from a middle 
group.
What about the expectations for-
mulated earlier? Again, an analysis of 
cross-sectional data cannot reveal signs 
of convergence. But there are similarities. 
Only a handful of countries still relies on 
early retirement. Direct job-creation is a 
little bit more prevalent, but the major-
ity of all countries uses this instrument 
only to a small extent, if at all. The Nor-
dic countries and the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries are rather similar when it comes to 
the work-relatedness of benefits and to 
certain behavioral requirements of ben-
efit claimants. Access to benefits is more 
universal than in Continental Europe, but 
more conditional on a certain behavior. 
There are also differences that cross-cut 
welfare regimes. This applies to the qual-
ity of placement services (counsellor/job 
seeker ratio), tax levels, obligations and 
sanctions, and to some degree the regu-
lation of part-time and flexible employ-
ment (where it is the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries that stand out as the least-regulated 
countries). Despite these similarities, the 
analysis of the composite indices showed 
strong support for the presence of three 
`worlds of activation’, with the Anglo-Sax-
on countries relying on enforcement, the 
Nordic countries balancing both enforce-
ment and enablement, and Continental 
Europe forming a heterogenous middle 
group. What is most notable is that there 
are no countries that are leaning towards 
enablement in the same way than the 
United States or New Zealand are leaning 
towards enforcement. It seems as if some 
degree of enforcement has become the 
standard - the main question is whether 
this is balanced or not. An entirely sup-
portive and enabling approach without 
any obligations and with generous ben-
efits cannot be found anywhere. There 
are also differences regarding the level 
to which activation in general has been 
pursued. It is Belgium, rather than the 
Southern European countries, that comes 
closest to the `do-nothing’ approach. Both 
enforcement and enablement are bal-
anced, but on a low level. France, and 
surprisingly, Finland and Denmark are 
also the countries with the lowest overall 
scores. As already mentioned, one should 
keep in mind that different elements of 
the `activation toolbox’ may have stronger 
effects on actual employment levels than 
others (Bradley/Stephens 2006; Martin 
2000; Martin/Grubb 2001). Just because 
Denmark has relatively low scores does 
not mean it is not successful at activating 
the unemployed. It seems to have high 
scores where it matters most.
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During the 1990s, there has been a num-
ber of reforms of labor market policies in 
Western, industrialized countries. This 
has led to a reconfiguration of social rights 
via reforms of unemployment benefit sys-
tems, but also due to changes in related 
policies. This paper has shown a way to 
operationalize and compare the different 
mixes of rights and responsibilities across 
countries. The present data capture the 
situation around the mid-2000s - that is, 
the situation in the OECD world after sig-
nificant reforms have taken place.
The findings are consistent with 
other (qualitative and quantitative) stud-
ies. First, there is no one-size-fits-all ap-
proach. Countries use different elements 
in different ways to achieve the same ob-
jective. Second, there are still differences 
in how `kind and gentle’ labor market 
policies are. Countries balance enforcing 
and enabling elements differently. The 
overall level of enforcement is quite simi-
lar around the OECD world. The Anglo-
Saxon countries are frontrunners when it 
comes to enforcing activation. Economic 
activity is to be maximized by providing 
as little alternative to market employment 
as possible. They combine rather low ben-
efits with strict behavioral requirements 
and few social rights (for instance servic-
es) to compensate. The Nordic countries 
place strict conditions in one respect: 
there are few reasons not to accept a job 
offer. Apart from that, benefit levels are 
quite high and services are comprehen-
5. Conclusion
sive. They do not many offer exit-options 
in the form of early retirement. As in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, employment is to 
be maximized, but not by complete com-
modification. Benefit claimants are re-
quired to be active, but these obligations 
are balanced with rights, for instance 
access to childcare services or train-
ing schemes. The Continental European 
countries exhibit a mixed pattern. Reflect-
ing social insurance principles, benefit 
levels are relatively high, but the access 
to these benefits is quite restricted. Con-
tinental European countries score high on 
single elements, yet are overall surpassed 
by the Nordic countries when it comes 
to the social rights of benefit claimants 
and job seekers. All in all, the results are 
generally in agreement with other stud-
ies, showing that an operationalization of 
activation policies using quantitative data 
is possible. The countries can be grouped 
into the familiar ` worlds of welfare capital-
ism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). However, 
this welfare state typology seems to fit 
less well on a few indicators, most nota-
bly placement services, job-availability 
requirements,  the regulation of flexible 
and part-time jobs, and `exit-routes’. Re-
forms (or the absence thereof) in these 
areas seem to cross-cut welfare regimes. 
Short of proving the `convergence’-thesis, 
one can nonetheless diagnose significant 
similarities between countries of different 
welfare regimes. The regime typology can 
explain the main overall differences, yet 
31
patterns on a few indicators remain to be 
explained.
Of course, the job is not done yet. So 
far, the dataset covers 20 OECD countries, 
yet there are more countries that need 
to be taken into account. Some OECD 
countries were left out due to data una-
vailability (Greece, for instance). It would 
be especially worthwhile to see how the 
Central and Eastern European countries 
now balance rights and responsibilities. 
Most importantly, this dataset needs to 
be expanded to cover more years. By in-
cluding the years from 1990 on, the data 
could show how labor market policies 
developed throughout the activation turn 
and provide the empirical basis for expla-
nations. On the other hand, by including 
later years, the data could show how the 
OECD world reacted to the financial and 
economic crises in the last half of the last 
decade (e.g. Hörisch/Weishaupt 2010). 
Finally, the existence of different `worlds 
of activation’ should be tested using sta-
tistical techniques such as cluster analysis 
(Everitt et al. 2011)
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Operationalization
This section will present how these ele-
ments are measured. The present data 
displays the situation around the mid-
2000s in most of the core OECD countries 
(some missing observations are unavoid-
able, however).  A note of caution at the 
beginning: it will not be possible to meas-
ure every last detail of every country’s 
unemployment benefit system and related 
policies since
“activation strategies encompass a 
large number of policies and pro-
grammes, which are combined in 
myriad ways” (Kenworthy 2010, 
444).
Even single policies are often very com-
plex as, for instance, entitlements may 
be differentiated by age, income level, 
or previous occupation. Care was taken 
to measure the characteristics of these 
policies as accurately as possible. In some 
cases (the indicators concerning benefits 
or taxes and contributions), average val-
ues or values for one representative group 
were taken in order to deal with the com-
plexity.
It is important to make sure the empir-
ical data matches the theoretical concept. 
In this regard, one needs to be aware of 
the the difference between outputs and 
outcomes (Green-Pedersen 2004; 2007). 
Outputs are actual government policies, 
e.g. the rules that govern benefit schemes. 
Outcomes are the effects of these policies, 
e.g. the expenditure on or take-up rate of 
a scheme. Since the theoretical concept 
here are policies, that is outputs, they 
should be measured as directly as possi-
ble. This is not always possible, however. 
The very obvious reason is that there is 
simply a lack of data. In some cases, one 
is faced with the choice between measur-
ing outputs with existing outcome data, 
or not to measure at all (when extensive 
data collection and coding is not an op-
tion due to a lack of resources and time). 
Hence, output data is used wherever pos-
sible. Where this is not possible, outcome 
data is used.
The available data sources cover dif-
ferent years. Many of them cover the 
years 2003 or 2004, yet in some cases the 
only available data refer to earlier or later 
years. This is of course only one cross-
section and policies have continued to 
change, but this cross-section reflects the 
labor market policy choices and priorities 
of the last years. The OECD Employment 
Outlook (OECD 2006a, 69-71) shows that 
different spending priorities on ALMPs 
introduced during the crucial period from 
the early 1990s on are reflected in differ-
ent spending patterns in the early 2000s. 
What remains to be problematic (at least 
as far as outcome data is concerned) is 
that the influence of other factors can-
not be controlled for by averaging over 
a longer time period. Moreover, the data 
do not allow to pinpoint specific points in 
time when reforms were implemented.
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Enforcing financial elements
Benefit levels and duration: Measure-
ments of the generosity of benefits for 
unemployed persons have to take the 
multi-tiered structure of unemployment 
benefit systems into account (Kvist 1998; 
Pfeifer 2012). An earnings-related unem-
ployment insurance scheme is usually 
combined with one or more means-tested 
social assistance schemes. Both benefits 
need to be taken into account, especially 
since the `lower tier’, social assistance, 
has become the regular tier for a number 
of unemployed persons due to the expan-
sion of precarious, low-paid employment 
(Clasen/Clegg 2006a; b; 2011). 
The generosity of unemployment in-
surance benefits is measured as `full-time 
equivalent’ payments of unemployment 
benefits, using OECD (2006a, 60: table 
3.2, p. 20) data. In particular, the level 
(net replacement rate) and the duration of 
benefit payments are multiplied to calcu-
late the amount of time that the previous 
wage is fully replaced. Net replacement 
rates are averaged over three income lev-
els (67, 100, 150 percent of the average 
production worker’s wage (APW)), two 
family types (single, one-earner couple; 
no children, two children) and including 
housing benefits and net of taxes and 
contributions. Net replacement rates are 
used since benefits are often taxed and 
gross replacement rates do not always in-
form about the actual disposable income 
(Obinger/Castles 2007). Net replacement 
rates differ with earnings, unemployment 
duration, and family type (OECD 2007b, 
62). Therefore, replacement rates are usu-
ally calculated for the`’average production 
worker’ or persons at different levels of 
his or her earnings, as well as for differ-
ent family types. The problem is that it 
is only possible to capture replacement 
rates for these groups while leaving oth-
ers out (Kvist 2002, 230). At least, aver-
aging takes progressiveness and exemp-
tions for families into account (even if this 
may hide differences in the treatment of 
different income groups). In addition, it 
is mostly less educated people that have 
a higher risk of becoming unemployed, 
so taking the average production worker 
should be somewhat representative (Kvist 
2002, 230). The duration of unemploy-
ment benefits is measured as the length 
of payments in weeks. 
The generosity of social assistance 
schemes is measured as the `replacement 
rate’ of social assistance benefits. This is 
calculated using the level of social assis-
tance benefits (including additional bene-
fits such as housing or child supplements 
and tax credits, if applicable) relative to 
the average wage. Data on social assis-
tance benefits was taken from the Social 
Assistance and Minimum Income Protec-
tion (SaMip) dataset by Nelson (2007; 
2008; 2010); data on average wages was 
taken from the OECD. Social assistance 
benefits are generally flat-rate and means-
tested, therefore they do not actually re-
place a previous income. The ratio of ben-
efit level to average wage indicates the 
level of the reservation wage and is hence 
illustrative of the wage social assistance 
recipients are expected to accept. In ad-
dition, they are usually not time-limited, 
hence the duration of benefit payments is 
irrelevant.
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Not all countries do actually have 
a multi-tier system. Australia and New 
Zealand do not have an unemployment 
insurance scheme; Belgium does have a 
two-tier system, yet the unemployment 
insurance scheme is practically unlim-
ited in duration. In Belgium, cohabitants 
can receive unemployment benefits, and 
they are the only ones that can have their 
benefits suspended after an overly 10 long 
period of unemployment (singles or heads 
of households are included since 2004, 
yet they can re-instate their eligibility by 
participating in activation programs (De 
Deken 2011, 114)). Since it is impossible 
to interpret or compare `infinite duration’, 
and since it would result in `infinite gen-
erosity’, Belgium is assigned a duration 
of five years (260 weeks) 11. Handling the 
Antipodean cases is less straightforward. 
Both do not have an unemployment insur-
ance scheme, but while New Zealand has 
only one main benefit scheme for all un-
10 The criterion (the Article 80) was introduced 
in 1991 and restricted in 1996 and 2004. At first, 
`overly long’ was defined as twice the amount of 
the average duration of unemployment spells, 
controlling for age, gender, and region of resi-
dence. This was reduced to 1.5 times the average 
duration in 1996. Since 2004, regional differences 
in unemployment duration do not matter anymore 
(De Deken 2011). In practice, this leads to benefit 
suspensions after three to four years, but it may 
take up to eight years until the termination process 
is initiated (Marx 2007, 131). 
11 This is, of course, an arbitrary choice and it does 
affect the score Belgium is assigned. Would it be 
assigned with a duration of 10 years, it would get 
a significantly higher score. Five years seems rea-
sonable, however, since it is still one year longer 
than in second-longest duration (in Denmark) and 
way longer than in most other countries, but it 
also accounts for the fact that at least a part of all 
claimants can be excluded.
employed, Australia has a more differenti-
ated system including unemployment as-
sistance schemes and additional schemes 
for particular groups (Nelson 2007; OECD 
2004b; 2007b) 12. Nelson’s SaMip dataset 
includes the Special Benefit scheme as the 
main social assistance scheme for Aus-
tralia and does not include the two unem-
ployment assistance schemes (Newstart & 
Youth Assistance). However, since Special 
Benefit claimants are constantly tested 
for eligibility to an unemployment as-
sistance scheme, it is assumed here that 
unemployment assistance is the regular 
scheme for Australians. Hence, Australia 
and New Zealand are both assumed not 
to have an unemployment insurance 
scheme. Instead of using the Special Ben-
efit as provided in SaMip, the Australian 
benefit level for unemployment assistance 
was taken from the OECD 13. 
Direct job-creation, disability pen-
sions, & early retirement: The reliance 
on ‘exit-options’ is measured as expen-
ditures on these programs in percent of 
the GDP. This is of course not as good 
an operationalization as actual output 
12 See also the Benefits & Wages country-specific 
files on Australia and New Zealand for 2003.
13 The average replacement rates for the family 
types corresponding to the ones in SaMip as 
provided by the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/60/54/49970915.xlsx; last access on June 
18, 2012). Note that the assumed children’s ages 
differ. The calculated benefit payments amount 
to 16318.3 (single, no children), 25917.3 (single, 
two children), and 30716.8 (couple, two children), 
assuming an average wage of 47995 AUD (as docu-
mented in the 2003 Benefits and Wages country-
specific file for Australia). The replacement rates 
for these three cases were multiplied by the aver-
age wage to retrieve the absolute amounts.
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data would be. However, the comparison 
of expenditure profiles across countries 
shows what role single programs play 
in each country compared to others. For 
example, a country that spends twice the 
amount on early retirement schemes than 
most others relies more on these schemes 
than other countries (see Castles 2002). 
Furthermore, Bonoli (2010) found that 
these expenditure profiles are consistent 
with qualitative findings in other studies. 
That means, even if they are not perfectly 
accurate measures, they display the situ-
ation correctly.
Direct job-creation schemes cover 
“measures that create additional jobs, 
usually of community benefit or socially 
useful, in order to find employment for the 
long-term unemployed or persons other-
wise difficult to place” (Grubb/Puymoyen 
2008, 19). Participants in early retirement 
programs are fully or partially retired old-
er workers “who are assumed to have lit-
tle chance of finding a job” (OECD 2011b, 
4).
Unfortunately, expenditure on early 
retirement does not include disability 
pensions (Grubb/Puymoyen 2008, 18). 
Some countries, for instance the Neth-
erlands, did rely to a large extent on dis-
ability pensions to allow the exit from 
the labor market, and considerable effort 
was placed on closing these exit routes 
(van Oorschot 2002; 2004; van Oorschot/
Engelfriet 2000). The OECD (2003, chap-
ter 6) has generated two indicators that 
measure the strength of the orientation 
towards inclusion of disabled persons 
and the orientation towards compensa-
tion. The country scores (covering the 
situation around 2000 on the integration 
dimension are taken as a measure for the 
activation effort in disability policy. The 
higher these scores the less can disabil-
ity benefits be taken as an exit route from 
regular employment. Instead, the higher 
these scores, the more effort is made to 
re-integrate disabled persons into the la-
bor market.
Enforcing non-financial elements
Sanctions The strictness of sanctions is 
measured using the data provided by Has-
selpflug (2005). This stems from a survey 
on unemployment benefit availability cri-
teria conducted by the Danish Ministry 
of Finance (see also Ministry of Finance 
1998). Hasselpflug provides data on the 
strictness of sanctions in three differ-
ent situations (voluntary unemployment, 
first refusal of ALMP participation or a 
suitable job, and following refusals). The 
average strictness of these three sanction 
types is used here. This approach is also 
used elsewhere (Allard 2005; Kvist 2002). 
The fact that benefit withdrawal can only 
be partial, for instance 30 percent for the 
first unjustified refusal, is also taken into 
account. Hasselpflug calculates sanc-
tions equivalent to a full withdrawal. For 
instance, “[t]he 26 weeks of reduction 
of 18 percent in Australia equals around 
5 weeks of temporary withdrawal” (Has-
selpflug 2005, 8). There are some short-
comings that have to be noted (Grubb 
2000, 157-63; Kvist 1998, 43-5; Trickey 
2000, 276-8). The actual strictness of 
sanctions may depend on the implemen-
tation practices. Legal stipulations may 
only be necessary if the public employ-
ment service (PES) does not already have 
sufficient competences (stipulated in, say, 
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administrative and not labor legislation). 
Thus, lenient requirements do not neces-
sarily mean less sanctioning. In addition, 
in case laws are vague and unclear, courts 
may prescribe the actual implementation. 
To cover all this is extremely difficult. It is 
hardly possible to take all these problems 
into account and assemble all this infor-
mation in one indicator. This means, one 
has to be aware of these problems when 
interpreting data on sanctions. Yet, there 
are reasons why one can use legal stipula-
tion to measure the orientation of activa-
tion policies. Even if the actual strictness 
depends on the implementation or on 
other factors, 
“legal stipulations do give an im-
portant signal to both administra-
tive authorities and claimants, and 
can be seen as a reflection of politi-
cian’s stance on the issue of obliga-
tions” (Kvist 2002, 231).
Even if there may be differences regard-
ing the actual application, sanctions can 
serve as a credible threat to enforce a cer-
tain behavior.
Job-availability criteria
The strictness of job-availability criteria is 
measured by the average value of occupa-
tional and geographical mobility require-
ments, the extent of valid refusals of job 
offers, and the availability requirements 
during ALMP participation. As with sanc-
tions, data provided by Hasselpflug (2005) 
are used to assess the strictness of job-
availability criteria in 2002/3. In principle, 
unemployed benefit recipients should be 
ready to get back into paid employment 
and become independent of benefits. Yet, 
there are differences between countries 
in how a `suitable job’ is defined (Clasen 
et al. 2001; Weishaupt 2011, 226). Re-
cipients can be required to accept jobs 
at greater distances from where they live, 
they can be required to take up jobs in a 
different field of employment than they 
used to work in, and accept lower wag-
es than they earned before. Clasen et al. 
(2001, 210) call this geographical, occu-
pational, and wage mobility obligations. 
As they further argue, the availability to 
participate in ALMPs may also be more 
or less required. As with sanctions, ac-
tual implementation might depend on the 
characteristics of the respective job seek-
er and the current administrative practice, 
and they can vary even within countries 
(Clasen et al. 2001, 210). 
Job-search requirements
Again, job-search requirements are meas-
ured using the data by the Danish Min-
istry of Finance (Hasselpflug 2005). Job 
seekers are often required to report their 
job-search efforts. For instance, they may 
have to show how many applications they 
did send or how many interviews they at-
tended  to in the last X weeks. This is also 
included in the Danish data on availabil-
ity criteria. They measure the frequency 
of required reports and the demands on 
job-search activities. Yet, this might also 
vary with administrative conventions and 
individual characteristics. 
Eligibility criteria
The ratio of minimum weeks in paid em-
ployment to the qualifying period is used 
to assess the strictness of eligibility crite-
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ria. The data have been retrieved from the 
MISSOC comparative tables  (European 
Union 2011) and the Social Security Pro-
grams Throughout the World database 
by the US Social Security Administration 
(2003; 2004). Access to unemployment 
benefits can be limited to people with a 
certain employment history (Clasen et 
al. 2001, 205-7). For instance, in order 
to qualify for benefits, one has to prove a 
minimum record of X weeks of paid em-
ployment or contribution payments within 
the last Y weeks. Furthermore, there may 
be specifications regarding the intensity 
of work (i.e. the number of hours worked 
per week). And there may be rules that 
exclude certain forms of activity, for in-
stance periods of childcare. 
However, the two sources do not re-
port information regarding the intensity 
of work and which activities are usually 
considered as relevant. Since information 
on the latter might be hard to compare 
systematically across countries, and the 
former are often nonexistent, the most 
reasonable way is to calculate ratios of 
employment period to qualifying period. 
Where an intensity requirement existed, 
full-time (40h/week) equivalents were cal-
culated.
Employment protection legislation
Fortunately, the OECD provides data on 
how hard it is to dismiss workers, that is, 
the strictness of employment protection 
legislation provisions covering the years 
from 1985 through 2008. Three different 
versions are available: version 1 covers 
EPL for regular and temporary contracts, 
version 2 adds regulations for collective 
dismissals. Version 3 is only available 
for the year 2008 and adds three further 
items 14. While it would be worthwhile 
to have the latest version of the indicator 
(Venn 2009), the fact that it is not avail-
able and “it is impracticable to accurately 
collect information about the new items 
prior to 2008” (OECD 2011a, 14), version 
2 has to suffice.
Enabling financial elements
Tax credits
Lower taxes or tax credits for low-income 
earners are measured by the average tax 
and contribution burdens for people earn-
ing 67 percent of the average wage (av-
eraged over the two family types 15). Tax 
and social contribution burdens are re-
ported by OECD.Stat (OECD 2002; 2004b; 
2007b). Only the tax burden for low-
income earners is used since the wedge 
between benefits and earnings should 
be most relevant for them. Tax credits or 
breaks should be reflected in a lower tax 
burden especially on lower incomes, and 
this should reflect the intention of govern-
ments to set financial incentives to take up 
work instead of relying on unemployment 
benefits. Family benefits are not included 
since it is not the extent of incentivizing 
family formation but the extent of incen-
tivizing employment (independent of the 
family status) that is of interest here.
14 Whether an authorization is necessary for the 
set-up of a temporary work agency, whether there 
are regulations ensuring equal treatment of regu-
lar and agency workers, and the maximum time to 
make a claim of unfair dismissal (OECD 2011a).
15 See the paragraph on unemployment benefits.
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Subsidies
The importance of subsidies to either low-
wage earners or their employers is meas-
ured - like the reliance on `exit options’ 
(above) - as expenditures in percent of the 
GDP. Wage subsidies (‘employment in-
centives’ in OECD terms) are paid to em-
ployers or employees to increase incen-
tives to take up jobs/hire new employees 
(Grubb/Puymoyen 2008, 16; Weishaupt 
2011, 67). 
Family taxation & parental leave  
schemes
Tax and benefit systems may discourage 
employment of second earners in couples 
where one spouse is already employed. 
This can be the case when women want to 
return to work after having cared for chil-
dren or frail relatives for some time. The 
burden on the income of second earners 
when moving from inactivity to employ-
ment is measured by the average effective 
tax rate (AETR) including costs for child-
care, or `implicit tax on returning to work’ 
for second earners at an earnings level of 
67 percent of the average earnings. The 
higher the implicit tax rate, the smaller 
the gain in net income from returning to 
work. Values above 100 percent indicate 
decreasing income (OECD 2007b, 107; 
2007c, 99).
In addition to childcare services, ma-
ternal leave schemes 16, combined with 
employment protection during the time of 
absence, can help to reconcile work and 
family life. Maternal leave schemes are 
16 The data can be downloaded under `http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/15/47/39680843.xls’, last access 
on October 12, 2011.
often combined with (mostly shorter) pa-
ternal leave schemes and supplementary 
parental leave schemes (OECD 2007a, 
104-8). Maternal leave schemes in combi-
nation with job guarantees may increase 
the employment of mothers (Gornick et 
al. 1997). Following the approach of the 
OECD, the generosity of these three fam-
ily policies is measured as the `full-time 
equivalent’ duration of payments parents 
are entitled to (OECD 2007a, 107) 17. 
Enabling non-financial elements
Counseling
The intention to increase the quality and 
frequency of job-search counseling is 
measured by the ratio of jobseekers to 
counselors using data provided by the ILO 
and the OECD. The ILO (2003) provides 
data from the World Association of Public 
Employment Services (WAPES) 2002 and 
2003 member surveys on the ratio of reg-
istered jobseekers to PES employees who 
work as actual job counselors 18 The nu-
merator is the number of registered job-
17 Full-time equivalent payments are defined as 
the duration of leave in weeks times the replace-
ment rate (percent of average earnings).
18 Belgium has three different PESs, so the value 
for Belgium is the average of the ratios of the three 
PESs. For some countries (Australia, Canada, 
France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden), only 
the total number of PES employees was available. 
According to the survey data, on average 57 per-
cent of the total employees in PESs in the selected 
OECD countries are dealing directly with job seek-
ers. The total number of PES employees in these 
countries was therefore weighted by 0.57.
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seekers in 2003 as provided by the OECD 
and the ILO 19.
It should be reasonable to assume that 
a counselor with a smaller caseload can 
monitor and aid more specifically and ef-
fectively than one who is basically over-
whelmed by requests. Governments who 
wish for better placement services can 
increase the number of counselors. Yet, 
it does not measure the actual frequency 
of interactions between counselor and 
job-seeker, or its quality. An even bigger 
problem is that governments do also have 
the option of contracting-out placement 
services, and some countries have used 
this option (Bruttel 2005; Fay 1997). This 
does not show up in these statistics.
Training & investment in human capital
Equal to `exit options’ and subsidies 
(above), reliance on training schemes and 
investment in human capital is measured 
as expenditures on training schemes in 
percent of the GDP using OECD data. 
Family services
The quality and availability of employ-
ment-friendly family services, most im-
portantly childcare services is difficult to 
measure. This is mostly due to the fact 
that comparative data is relatively scarce 
(OECD 2006b, ch 8). The OECD Family Da-
tabase (cf. Adema et al. 2009; data taken 
from Thévenon 2011) does provide data 
19 Some countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, Ita-
ly, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States) 
are not included in the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators database. The numbers for Finland and 
the Netherlands could be retrieved from the ILO 
Key Indicators  of the Labour Market database. The 
remaining countries had to be coded as missing.
on enrollment rates in formal childcare 
(0-3 years) and in early childhood educa-
tion and care (ECEC) (3-5 years), as well 
as data on the the intensity care (hours/
week) - but only for 0-3 year olds. Fol-
lowing the approach by Lambert (2008), 
the intensity of ECEC provision was ap-
proximated (for instance by using usual 
operating hours) using various qualitative 
sources 20. Hence, to measure the extent 
of the provision of public childcare and 
ECEC services, full-time equivalent enroll-
ment rates were calculated 21.
One might argue that low enrollment 
rates do not stem from missing facilities 
but from missing demand. However, ex-
cept for countries with already highly 
developed family services (Denmark, Fin-
land, Sweden),
“reports from all review countries 
indicate that demand for services 
for young children is significantly 
higher than the available number 
of places - including in countries 
that provide long parental leave, a 
measure that helps to reduce de-
mand” (OECD 2006b, 87).
20 These sources include the OECD (2006b) Start-
ing Strong II study, the OECD (2004a) Babies and 
Bosses Vol. 3 study, the Family Policy Database by 
Gornick and Meyers (2003), Sementini et al. (2004), 
the Clearinghouse on International Developments 
in Child, Youth and Family Policies (Kamerman/
Kahn 2012), Adema (2006), Jones (2011), and the 
OECD Thematic Review of Early Childhood Educa-
tion and Care (Doherty et al. 2003; OECD 2000; 
Press/Hayes 2000).
21 Another option would be spending on services 
per child as included in the same database. How-
ever, as the OECD (2006b, 103) itself admits, these 
numbers can be highly misleading.
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Part-time and flexible work
Kenworthy (2010, 440-1) mentions two 
instruments to encourage part-time and 
flexible work. First, equal treatment of 
part-time workers in terms of wages and 
benefit status. Second, protections for 
persons with flexible work schedules. 
This is also what was introduced in the 
Netherlands, where a large part of the 
growth in employment was achieved by 
expanding part-time employment (see 
also van Oorschot 2004). Accordingly, 
the intention to encourage part-time and 
flexible work is measured on a 10-point 
scale 22, using information by Hegewisch 
and Gornick (2008, 18: table 2) and He-
gewisch (2009). Hegewisch and Gornick 
name seven statutes that enable `alterna-
tive work arrangements’ 23. Hegewisch 
names three further criteria 24. Legislation 
22 Higher scores meaning more encouragement 
and protection.
23 Universal access to reduced working hours; 
gradual return to work for parents; part-time 
parental leave; reduced working hours for parents; 
right to refuse overtime or shift patterns for par-
ents; reduced hours for persons caring for other 
adults; reduced hours for persons participating in 
training schemes; the right to reduce hours when 
starting pension recipiency was omitted since this 
is rather facilitating early retirement and therefore 
not activating.
24 Equal treatment in terms of wages and benefit 
entitlements, access to full-time work for part-
time employees, linkage of benefits to hours 
worked (here, a `yes’ means a score of 0).
that was implemented after 2004 was not 
taken into account. Japan is not included 
in these two surveys, but Higo and Yam-
ada (2009) and Houseman (1995) provide 
comparable information 25.
25 Japan is given 0 out of 10 points because the 
law to promote flexible work hours merely obliges 
employers to `endeavor’ to provide flexible hours. 
Similarly, until 2008 employers should merely en-
deavor to provide equal opportunities for part-time 
workers. Protection from dismissals is weaker 
for part-time workers, they may be excluded from 
collective agreements, and they are excluded from 
unemployment benefits (Higo/Yamada 2009, 9 & 
11; Houseman 1995, 251-7).
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